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Indonesian Discourse on Human Rights and Freedom of 
Religion or Belief: Muslim Perspectives 
Syamsul Arifin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Discussion on the relationship between Islam and human rights is not 
a new subject. However, this topic remains an interesting subject because 
the development of Islam, either as a religious phenomenon or as a social 
and political phenomenon, is constantly connected to the issue of human 
rights. In the context of Indonesian Islam, the connection between Islam 
and human rights has developed in interesting ways because of the 
changing political atmosphere in the post-New Order following the fall 
of Suharto, the former president of Indonesia, from his office on May 21, 
1998. Scholars Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra find at least four 
significant developments in the Muslim society in the post-New Order 
era that are connected with human rights, either on the discourse level or 
on the practical level.1 
The first development mentioned by Salim and Azra is the 
replacement of Pancasila2 with Islam as the dominant party ideology. 
Following this change, Islam-based parties, such as Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP) and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) exclusively offere 
 
 *   Professor of Sociology of Religion, University of Muhammadiyah Malang, East Java, 
Indonesia; Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Multiculturalism at the Postgraduate 
Program of the University of Muhammadiyah Malang, East Java, Indonesia. Professor Syamsul 
Arifin also is a Vice Director of the Postgraduate Program of the University of Muhammadiyah 
Malang. 
 1. Arskal Salim & Azyumardi Azra, Introduction: The State and Shari’a in the Perspective 
of Indonesian Legal Politics, in SHARI’A AND POLITICS IN MODERN INDONESIA 1, 1–16 (Arskal 
Salim & Azyumardi Azra eds., 2003). 
 2.  Pancasila is the official philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. Pancasila 
consists of two Old Javanese words, "pañca" meaning five, and "sīla" meaning principles. It 
comprises five principles held to be inseparable and interrelated: (1) belief in the one and only God 
(in Indonesian, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa); (2) just and civilized humanity (in Indonesian, 
Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab); (3) the unity of Indonesia (in Indonesian, Persatuan 
Indonesia); (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations 
amongst representatives (in Indonesian, Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, 
Dalam Permusyawaratan dan Perwakilan); and (5) social justice for all of the people of Indonesia 
(in Indonesian, Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia). 
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political ideas based on Islamic shari’ah. PPP and PBB have been very 
persistent in trying to amend the Constitution of 1945 with the inclusion 
of seven words: “dengan kewajiban melaksanakan syariat Islam bagi 
pemeluknya,” which means “with the obligation to observe Islamic 
shari’ah for its adherents.” PPP and PBB claim that if these seven words 
were included, Islamic shari’ah would officially have constitutional 
status in the national legal system. The agenda promoted by PPP and 
PBB failed in the Indonesian legislature (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat (MPR) or the People Consultative Assembly) in 2000, 2001, and 
2003. 
Changes in ideological orientation—the second development in the 
post-New Order period—also take place at the societal level. In some 
places, there is an increasing demand for the implementation of Islamic 
shari’ah, similar to what has been done in the regions of Aceh and South 
Celbes. 
The third development is the emergence of hardline Muslim groups, 
such as Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI), and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). The 
emergence of these hardline Muslim groups often leads to social clashes 
as a result of the groups’ use of violence. FPI, for example, often attacks 
discothèques, night clubs, and other entertainment places. FPI believes 
that through these actions, they are implementing the doctrine of al-amr 
bi al-ma’ruf and al-nahy ‘an al-munkar.3 
According to Salim and Azra, the fourth development is the 
increasing popularity of an Islamic magazine, Sabili, which, according to 
an AC Neilsen survey, has the second largest circulation in Indonesia 
after Gadis, a teen magazine.4 Sabili weekly magazine prints more than 
100,000 copies of each edition.5 Initially, Sabili called itself a magazine 
of preaching, but recently it seems to have promoted Islamic politics, 
particularly those propagated by hardline Muslim groups. In some 
volumes, Sabili supports the formal implementation of Islamic shari’ah 
in Indonesia.6 In Sabili’s view, the best solution to get Indonesia out 
 
 3.  This Qur'anic exhortation is often translated as "Command the good and forbid the evil," 
but this translation fails to reflect the subtleties of the Arabic. Amr refers to the enforcement function 
of the duly constituted government of an ummah (community). In this context, Ma'ruf, when applied 
to a particular law, means a law which is (1) known to the community (i.e., the community is aware 
of its existence); (2) intelligible (understood by and makes sense) to the community; and (3) 
generally recognized and commonly acknowledged as a good law. 
 4.  Salim & Azra, supra note 1, at 1–16. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id. 
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from crisis is through returning to the way of Allah by implementing 
Islamic shari’ah.7 
The four developments above illustrate the implications for the 
relationship between Islam and human rights. The most salient, of 
course, are violent acts, which are often used by FPI. Among hardline 
Muslim groups, the actions of FPI are the most publicized. FPI, for 
example, has been reported to have been involved in a clash with Aliansi 
Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama atau Berkeyakinan (AKKBB), 
the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion or Belief at the National 
Monument (Monumen Nasional—Monas) in June 2008.8 This clash 
happened due to the different views about Ahmadiyah, an Islamic sect. 
FPI views Ahmadiyah as a deviant sect that has no rights to live in 
Indonesia. In contrast, AKKBB advocates for Ahmadiyah. For AKKBB, 
the existence of Ahmadiyah should not be prohibited. AKKBB argues 
that it is exercising its freedom of religion or belief to advocate for 
Ahmadiyah.9 In human rights literature, the use of violence, either by 
state or by society, which aims to attack another group with a different 
religion or belief is considered a type of persecution that contradicts 
human rights principles.10 When this persecution involves an Islamic 
 
 7.  See Rita Ayuningtyas, FPI Beringas, 10 Anggota AKKBB Terluka Parah [FPI Violent, 
10 members of AKKBB Hurt Worse], KOMPAS.COM, June 1, 2008, 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/06/01/16521199/fpi.beringas.10.anggota.akkbb.terluka.parah.  
 8.  Id.  
 9.  See id. On June 1, 2008, the “Monas incident” occurred. The "National Alliance for 
Freedom of Religion and Belief" (AKKBB) was to be staged at Monas, Jakarta, on the day of the 
birth of Pancasila. AKKBB was attacked by a mob that was attributed to the FPI (Islam Defender 
Front). FPI beat the National Alliance members in various ways, destroyed equipment, and ripped 
and burned banners. Fourteen people were injured and nine of them were hospitalized. The police 
broke up and scattered the groups, and some fled to the National Gallery. The attacks were 
coordinated with the police, who were scattered. The Head of the Public Relations Division, Police 
Headquarters Inspector General Abubakar Nataprawira, denied that the police were liable for acts of 
omission. Munarman, as chairman of the Warriors of Islam, stated that the attack was carried out 
because the perpetrators were an action group supporting Ahmadiyya, and not for the anniversary of 
Pancasila. Munarman also disagrees that the FPI was a principal actor, and stated that the attack was 
carried out by the Command Warriors of Islam. Chairman of the Muslim Ummah Forum, Mashadi, 
also showed a video that claimed to be a provocation to the FPI and claimed that the FPI attacked 
AKKBB as a result of the provocation. The video contains footage of a protester who was allegedly 
carrying a weapon, but no clear shape was shown. 
 10.  See Mohammed S.M. Eltayeb, A Human Rights Framework for Defining and 
Understanding Intra-Religious Persecution in Muslim Countries, in THE CHALLENGE OF RELIGIOUS 
DISCRIMINATION AT THE DAWN OF THE MILLENIUM 83, 91 (Nazila Ghanea ed., 2003) (“[R]eligious 
persecution constitutes a situation of gross violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion or belief . . . that includes violations of the right to life, to personal integrity or personal 
liberty.”). 
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religious group, the use of violence influences the image of Islam in 
human rights enforcement. Meanwhile, many hope that either religion or 
society will help to develop a moral and social commitment to 
implementing human rights.11 
II. THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Seen from a historical perspective, the development of human rights 
ideas has been neglected by religion and religious leaders. The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, passed on December 10, 1948, was done 
largely without religious influence. A fair recognition of the limited role 
of religion in this process is revealed by Franz Magnis Suseno, a 
professor of philosophy at the School of Philosophy—Sekolah Tinggi 
Filsafat (STF) Driyarkara Jakarta. In one of his writings on human rights 
in light of contemporary Catholic theology,12 Suseno said that the idea of 
human rights did not emerge from the churches, but, on the contrary, 
originated from the reflections of philosophers and politicians who saw 
the suffering of society.13 Suseno also asserts that Catholic churches 
were initially uncomfortable with and even attacked the modern idea of 
human rights, although in 1963 they became much more open.14 
Although there are clear differences between Islam, Catholicism, and 
other religions, Islam’s acceptance of human rights did not happen 
smoothly. Some literature discussing the relationship between Islam and 
human rights reveals the resistance shown by many scholars as well as 
Muslim states against human rights. Books written by Ann Elizabeth 
Mayer15 and Daniel E. Price16 explain the concept of “cultural 
relativism,” which is the basis Muslim scholars cite to reject universal 
human rights. Using the concept of cultural relativism, human rights 
principles are seen as very limited when applied in the societies of 
Muslim countries, which have many cultural differences from the 
societies of the pioneers of universal human rights in Western 
 
 11.  See Khaled Abou al-Fad, The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE WORLD RELIGIONS 301 (Joseph Runzo, et al.  eds., 2003). 
 12.  Franz Magnis Suseno, Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Teologi Katholik, in DISEMINASI HAK 
ASASI MANUSIA: PERSPEKTIF DAN AKSI, 84 (E.Shobirin Nadj & Naning Mardinah eds., 2000). 
 13.  Id. at 85. 
 14.  Id. at 84. 
 15.  See ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 
(3d ed. 1999). 
 16.  See DANIEL E. PRICE, ISLAMIC POLITICAL CULTURE, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1999). 
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countries.17 Moreover, the West, which is viewed as a dominant force in 
creating and disseminating the idea of human rights, also has an 
imperfect record regarding human rights enforcement, even when 
compared to Muslim countries, which are often viewed critically by the 
West.18 
Not all Muslim scholars agree with the concept of cultural relativism. 
Todung Mulya Lubis19 regards the distinction of human rights on the 
basis of cultural universalism and relativism as no longer relevant, 
particularly after many countries ratified fundamental instruments of 
human rights published by the United Nations. A constructive idea on 
human rights is also promoted by Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na’im. Like 
Lubis, an-Na’im also argues that human rights constitute principally a 
universal idea.20 At the time of its formulation as a universal idea, which 
subsequently became known as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, religion was not consciously used as a justifying foundation, so 
that fundamental ideas of human rights could be used either by religious 
or irreligious people.21 
Instead of rejecting the secular nature of universal human rights 
sparked by the United Nations, this prominent Muslim thinker of Sudan 
firmly calls all Muslims to recognize that the concept of universal human 
rights is the product of international consensus.22 In an-Na’im’s view, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an important instrument 
for protecting human dignity and for enhancing human welfare, thanks to 
the universality of the moral and political power it has.23 An-Na’im is of 
course aware that his call and constructive views will harvest protests 
and rejections from some Muslims who maintain their view of cultural 
relativism. 
With this awareness, an-Na’im persistently conducts research on 
Islamic law to find a more positive and reconciliatory relationship 
between shari’ah and human rights. Before the publication of Islam and 
the Secular State, an-Na’im published Toward an Islamic Reformation: 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Todung Mulya Lubis, Perkembangan Pemikiran, Teori dan Perdebatan HAM, in 
DISEMINASI HAK ASASI MANUSIA: PERSPEKTIF DAN AKSI 12 (E.Shobirin Nadj & Naning Mardinah 
eds., 2000). 
 20.  ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE 
FUTURE OF SHARI’A 112–16 (2008). 
 21.  Id. at 115. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
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Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law in 1990.24 In both 
books, an-Na’im frames his arguments from the perspective of Islamic 
law to strengthen a positive and reconciliatory relationship between 
Islam and human rights. An important conclusion, according to an-
Na’im, is that Islam as a religious phenomenon can be used as a tool for 
legitimizing universal human rights.25 
An-Na’im’s idea is supported by Rhoda E. Howard. Like an-Na’im, 
Howard also argues that human rights, as developed by the United 
Nations, were a product of secular thought, not divine decision.26 Aware 
of the secular nature of human rights ideas, Howard does not regard 
religious legitimacy as an absolute necessity.27 But if it guarantees the 
implementation of human rights, religious legitimacy as developed by 
an-Na’im deserves high appreciation. In light of the significance of the 
religious aspect of human rights, the views of Joseph Runzo, Nancy M. 
Martin, and Arvind Sharma in their introduction to Human Rights and 
Responsibilities in the World Religions should be given attention: 
Religions have too often been used to justify the violation of human 
rights, in part through the hierarchical and selective use of role ethics 
and the postponement of temporal justice to divine judgment or future 
karmic consequences. Yet the world religions have also provided a 
constant voice of critique against the violation of human rights by 
calling for equity, and universal compassion and  
 
love, calls which reach far beyond the mere protection of human 
rights.28 
An important point according to Runzo, Martin, and Sharma is that 
religion, though often misused to justify the violation of human rights, 
can, in a positive construction, be used as a source of energy for the 
enforcement of human rights. Although human rights have become the 
subject of international regulation, the violation of human rights still 
often takes place in some countries. Among the violations of human 
rights that should be given attention is the violation of freedom of 
religion or belief. Freedom of religion or belief is a fundamental human 
 
 24.  ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990). 
 25.  Id. at 187. 
 26.  RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 12–13 (1995). 
 27.  See id.  
 28.  Joseph Runzo et al., Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 
WORLD RELIGIONS 1, 1 (Joseph Runzo et al. eds., 2003). 
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right, which prevails universally and is codified in the international 
instrument of human rights. On the normative level, since the earliest 
phase of human rights, it has been clear that freedom of religion or belief 
is a fundamental right, and certainly one of the most important rights. 
Emerging after World War II, these rights have been formulated in 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 
As one of the most fundamental rights, the implementation of 
freedom of religion or belief is based on eight norms:29 
First is internal freedom. Based on this norm, each individual is 
viewed as having the rights to “freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion.” This norm also recognizes the freedom of each individual to 
“have, adopt, defend or change his religion or belief.” 
Second is external freedom. This norm recognizes the freedom to 
express freedom of religion or belief in all aspects of manifestation, such 
as freedom in “teaching, practices, worship and observance.” The 
manifestation of freedom of religion or belief can be performed either in 
the private or public sphere. Freedom can also be manifested individually 
or collectively with others. 
Third is non-coercion. This norm emphasizes the existence of 
individual freedom from any form of coercion in adopting a certain 
religion or belief. In other words, each individual has freedom to have a 
religion or belief without being compelled by anybody. 
 
Fourth is nondiscrimination. Based on this norm, the state is obliged 
to respect and ensure that all individuals within its sovereignty and 
jurisdiction obtain the guarantee of freedom of religion or belief 
regardless of “race, sex, language, religion or belief,” political ideologies 
or other views, national origins, wealth, and birth status. 
Fifth is the right of parents and guardians. According to this norm, 
the state is obliged to respect the freedom of legally valid parents and 
guardians to conduct religious and moral education for their children in 
accordance with their own belief. The state is also obliged to protect the 
rights of each child to have freedom of religion or belief according to 
their own ability. 
Sixth is corporate freedom and legal status. An important aspect of 
freedom of religion or belief particularly in contemporary life is the 
 
 29.  BYU INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND RELIGION STUDIES & THE NORWEGIAN 
CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 
xxxvii–xxxix (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., 2004).  
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prevailing rights of religious communities to organize themselves or to 
establish associations. 
Seventh is the limit of permissible restrictions on external freedom. 
The freedom to express a religion or belief is subject to limitation by law 
with the reason to protect “public safety, order, health,” morality and 
other fundamental rights. 
Eighth is non-derogability. State should not reduce the rights to 
freedom of religion or belief even in emergency situations. 
Indonesia has a solid normative foundation guaranteeing freedom of 
religion or belief. The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution outlines the 
Pancasila, the first principle of which is “Belief in Almighty God.”30 
This sets out the Indonesian state as one with religious characteristics. 
The Constitution also contains two chapters containing guarantees for 
freedom of religion, namely Chapter XA on Human Rights, and Chapter 
XI on Religion. In Chapter XA, Article 28E states: “Each person is free 
to embrace a religion and to worship according to that religion. Each 
person has the right to freedom in his or her beliefs, to assert his or her 
thoughts and views, in accordance with his or her conscience.”31 
The Constitution also states that this right may not be derogated in 
any circumstance,32 although limitations may be put in place by law 
(undang-undang) in order to satisfy just demands based upon 
considerations of morality, religious values, security, and public order in 
a democratic society.33 Article 28I of the Constitution also mandates that 
each person has the right to be free from discriminatory behavior and has 
the right to protection from such treatment.34 
In Chapter XI, Article 29, the Constitution maintains that: “The State 
is based on belief in Almighty God. The State guarantees all persons the 
freedom to embrace his or her own religion and to worship according to 
that religion and [religious] belief.”35 
Affirming the protection contained in the Constitution, Article 22 of 
Law No. 39/1999 concerning Human Rights repeats the Constitutional 
guarantees on religious freedom:36 “Everyone has the right to choose his 
or her religion and to worship according to this religion and [religious] 
 
 30.  UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] 1945, Preamble. 
 31.  Id. art. 28e.  
 32.  Id. art. 28i. 
 33.  Id. art. 28j(2). 
 34.  Id. art. 28i(2). 
 35.  Id. ch. XI, art. 29. 
 36.  Act Concerning Human Rights (Law No. 39/1999) (Indon.). 
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belief. The state guarantees everyone the freedom to choose and practice 
his or her religion and to worship according to this religion and 
[religious] belief.” 
Law No. 39/1999 also contains the same provisions in relation to 
derogations and limitations but does not permit limitations based upon 
considerations of religious values. Under Law No. 39/1999, limitations 
may be placed on the right to freedom of religion by law to guarantee 
recognition and respect for the basic rights and freedoms of other 
persons.37 Each person has the right to protection of human rights and 
basic freedoms without discrimination.38 
In addition to the protection provided by the Constitution and Law 
No. 39/1999, Indonesia ratified the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)39 in 1999 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)40 
in 2005. It made no reservations in relation to freedom of religion or 
belief at the time of ratification or subsequently. 
 
Once Indonesia ratified these two treaties they became national 
law,41 and the government was immediately obliged to respect, protect, 
implement, and advance the human rights contained in them.42 
The ICCPR contains specific guarantees in relation to freedom of 
religion or belief. Article 18 reads:43 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others, in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2.  No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom 
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
 
 37.  UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] 1945, arts. 4, 70, 73.  
 38.  Id. art. 3(3). 
 39.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 40.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 41.  Act Concerning Human Rights (Law No. 39/1999), art.7(2) (Indon.). 
 42.  Act Concerning Human Rights (Law No. 39/1999), art.71 (Indon.). 
 43.  Supra note 40. 
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freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant respect the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to ensure the religious 
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions. 
As Indonesia has ratified the ICCPR and it immediately became 
national law, it is important to understand what its legal obligations are, 
and therefore what constitutes the normative core of the human right to 
freedom of religion or belief. 
The ICCPR has certain core values that must be protected by 
governments if freedom of religion or belief (as a universal standard) is 
to be respected. These core values constitute a set of minimum standards. 
Freedom of religion or belief, as codified in legally binding 
international human rights instruments, applies to every human being in 
Indonesia’s jurisdiction, without exception. Human beings are the 
primary holders and beneficiaries of this right. States, ideally under 
continual critical scrutiny by informed citizens in each country, are the 
primary addressees burdened with the correlative obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfill this right. Beyond the religious freedom 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
ICCPR, key elaborations and specifications of the human right to 
freedom of religion or belief are provided by, among others, the 1981 
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.44 
General Comment No. 22 (48)45 of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee provides normative substance to Article 18 of the ICCPR, 
which states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.”46 Relevant regional sources are the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),47 the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR),48 and the African Charter on Human and 
 
 44.  Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based 
on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. A/Res/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981). 
 45.  Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 153 (2003). 
 46.  Supra note 40. 
 47.  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005; 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 48.  Organization of American States American, Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36; 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
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Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).49 
Although it has strong normative foundations, Indonesia is not yet 
free from violations of freedom of religion or belief. Based on an 
analysis by Imparsial,50 violations committed by the state against 
freedom of religion or belief employ two modes.51 The first mode is 
when the state indirectly commits violations by allowing various violent 
acts to occur.52 In some cases it is clear that the police let violent acts 
happen and do not prevent the actions, thereby encouraging a group of 
people to continue their violent actions to close places of worship or to 
attack the beliefs of other groups. As an institution which has the 
authority to control the security and order of society, the police ought to 
take actions against the doers of violent acts. But it is very often the 
police who allow the violations, as if the acts were justified. The acts of 
connivance on the part of the security officers, according to Imparsial, 
cannot be justified because, it means that state does not guarantee and 
protect the freedom of religion or belief of the people.53 
In the second mode, the state directly violates rights through the 
formulation and strengthening of various policies which limit and repress 
freedom of religion or belief.54 According to Ghufron Mabruri,55 this 
violation is caused by the inability of a state to distance itself from affairs 
of religion. Freedom of religion or belief is a part of civil and political 
rights categorized as negative rights. These are different from social, 
economic, and cultural rights which are categorized as positive rights. 
Positive rights (social, economic, and cultural) can be fulfilled if a state 
takes an active part in promoting the rights. On the contrary, negative 
rights can be fulfilled and manifested only when a state does not intrude 
too far into the affairs of society. 
Mabruri mentions the existence of the Directorate of the Surveillance 
of Society Belief and Religious Stream as an example of state 
intervention in the affairs of religion and belief.56 This Directorate is 
 
 49.  Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 245. 
 50.  Imparsial is an NGO engaged in monitoring and investigating human rights abuses in 
Indonesia. See IMPARSIAL, www.imparsial.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Ghufron Mabruri, Kebebasan Beragama dalam Negara Demokrasi, 4 HURIDOCS-
IMPARSIAL 4 (2007). 
 56.  Id.  
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under the Grand Attorney and was established through a regulation57 that 
set up a Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society. 
According to Mabruri, the role of the state ought to be limited only to 
guaranteeing the rights of each individual citizen.58 Mabruri argues that 
in regards to freedom of religion or belief, the state should do two things. 
First, it should not create regulations which limit and repress freedom of 
religion.59 Freedom of religion or belief is a non-derogable human right 
held in any condition and by any person, consisting of the right to life, 
the right not to be tortured, the right to individual freedom, the right of 
religion, the right not to be enslaved, the right to be respected as an 
individual, the right to equality before the law, and the right not to be 
persecuted on the basis of retrospective law.60 The protection of these 
fundamental human rights is regulated in Law Number 3961 on human 
rights. In its explanation, it states that “in any condition” includes war, 
armed conflict, and/or emergencies.62 “Any person” means states, 
governments, and/or members of society.63 This law can obviously be 
understood to mean that in Indonesia, freedom of religion is guaranteed 
and protected by the government. Therefore, all forms of unfair and 
discriminative practices on the basis of ethnicity, race, color, culture, 
nation, religion, sex, and social status that can result in anguish, misery, 
and social discrepancy should be abolished. Second, the state should 
prevent any potential disturbances and constraints that might keep an 
individual from being able to choose and observe his belief in the midst 
of society.64 
The violation of freedom of religion or belief by the state provides an 
opportunity for members of society to conduct the same violations. In 
other words, society also becomes an actor performing violations of 
freedom of religion or belief after the state has created an opportunity. 
But, is violation by society only caused by an opportunity given by the 
state? Although the state’s influence should not be dismissed, the internal 
conditions of society that cause violations of freedom of religion or 
belief also need to be explored. Is the violation of freedom of religion or 
 
 57.  Letter of Decision of the General Attorney Number KEP-108/JA/5/1984 (1984). 
 58.  Mabruri, supra note 55. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Act Concerning Human Rights (Law No. 39/1999), art. 4 (Indon.). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Marbruri, supra note 55. 
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belief by society related to the way one group perceives another group? 
A study by Fatimah Husein, a professor at the State Islamic University of 
Yugyakarta, deserves special attention in answering this question.65 
Muslim-Christian relations, the focus of Husein’s study, is an 
important and sensitive subject. Conflict and violence often color the 
development of Islam and Christianity in Indonesia. In Husein’s view, 
Muslim-Christian relations cannot be separated from the way the 
adherents of both religions perceive their own religion and the religion of 
others.66 In her study, Husein reveals two perceptions dominant among 
Muslims which influence Islam-Christian relations—exclusive and 
inclusive. Exclusive Muslims have the conviction that Islam is the last 
religion which corrects the faults of previous religions. This perception, 
according to Husein, results in an intolerant attitude toward other 
religions.67 Inclusive Muslims hold the conviction that Islam is a true 
religion,68 but they do not negate religions outside Islam, which can also 
provide salvation for their adherents.69 With this view, inclusive 
Muslims behave more openly toward other religious groups.70 
Husein’s categories can be used to explain the violations of freedom 
of religion or belief conducted by members of society. The violations of 
freedom of religion or belief are influenced by the way the actors 
perceive other religions or beliefs. Among these two perspectives, the 
one with the most potential to commit violations is the exclusive 
perspective. When discussing Husein’s definition of exclusivism, it is 
important to quote Joseph Runzo’s definition of religious exclusivism: 
“the religious attitude which holds that the only true religion is one’s 
own religion or belief, while other religions or beliefs are false.”71 Why 
are some people exclusive, while others are inclusive? Is this perspective 
influenced by religious doctrines? If exclusivism is influenced by 
religious doctrine and it potentially leads to the violation of freedom of 
religion or belief, can it be said that religion is responsible for this 
violation? Religion is often suspected of not having contributed to the 
strengthening of freedom of religion. 
 
 65.  Fatimah Husein, Muslim-Christian Relations, in THE NEW ORDER INDONESIA: THE 
EXCLUSIVIST AND INCLUSIVIST MUSLIMS’ PERSPECTIVES 29 (2005). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Runzo et al., supra note 28, at 18.  
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Islam is among the great world religions that are often perceived 
with prejudice and pessimism with regard to the freedom of religion or 
belief. In the discourse of political science and academic literature, 
particularly among Western scholars, Islam is often regarded as 
incompatible with human rights.72 This sparks criticism and rejection 
from Muslim scholars and academics. They disagree with the view that 
Islam is incompatible with human rights. When compared, Islamic 
doctrine spoke about human rights earlier than its western counterparts. 
The history of human rights in the West began with the Magna Charta 
(1215), which was followed by the Bill of Rights (1688), the Declaration 
of Independence of the United States (1776), the Déclaration des droits 
de l’Homme et du Citoyen, France (1789), the Four Freedoms speech 
given by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). Islam has spoken about freedom, including 
freedom of religion or belief, since the seventh century, as revealed by 
many Qur’anic verses. Ebrahim Moosa argues that at least two narratives 
can be used as proofs of the compatibility between Islam and human 
rights.73 First is the farewell speech of the Prophet Muhammad during a 
pilgrimage (hajjatul-wada’), in which he reasserted the Islamic vision of 
fundamental human rights protection. The substance of the Prophet’s 
speech at the pilgrimage, according to Moosa, was a reassertion of the 
substance of the Qur’anic verses dealing with the protection of human 
property, dignity, and honor.74 The second narrative regards the actions 
of the guided caliphs to punish the violation of human rights. One of the 
most important examples in human rights enforcement was Umar ibn al-
Khattab’s warning to the governor of Egypt, ‘Amr ibn ‘As, who gave 
punishment without the process of court. The two historical narratives 
above, according to Moosa, are often referenced by Muslims to endorse 
theological arguments on the relation between Islam and modern human 
rights.75 
In light of this historical account, Muslims have rejected the view 
that Islam is incompatible with human rights. However, it should be 
taken into account that some groups of Muslims draw on theological 
considerations when they exhibit an exclusive attitude toward certain 
 
 72.  Sus Eko Ernada, Issues of Compatibility of Human Rights and Islam: The Experience of 
Egypt and Indonesia, 1 J. INDON. ISLAM 100–01 (2007). 
 73.  Ebrahim Moosa, The Dilemma of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 185, 188 
(2000). 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. 
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religous groups, which can lead to the violation of freedom of religion or 
belief. This exclusive attitude can easily emerge because Islamic doctrine 
as stated in the Qur’an allows for multi-interpretation. On the one hand, 
the Qur’an gives recognition to freedom of religion as stated in al-
Baqarah (2) 256, al-Shura (42) 48, al-Ghashiyah (88) 21, Yunus (10) 99, 
al-Kahfi (18) 29, Qaf (50) 45, and al-Kafirun (109) 6. These verses, 
according to Muhammad Hashim Kamali,76 prove that Islam is a religion 
which affirms freedom of religion and pluralism. However, on the other 
hand, there are some verses in the Qur’an which may, with a particular 
interpretation, create a complicated relationship between Islam and 
human rights as explained in a book entitled Tolerance and Coercion in 
Islam.77 Meanwhile, Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na’im finds at least five cases 
in the Qur’an, which are often used by some Muslims to justify their 
discriminatory actions due to differences in gender, religion, and belief. 
The five cases presented by an-Na’im are as follows:78 
First, a Muslim man is allowed to marry a Christian woman, whereas a 
Christian or Jewish man is not allowed to marry a Muslim woman. 
Muslim men and women are not allowed to marry polytheists. 
Second, religious differences become a constraint on mutual 
inheritance relationships. A Muslim man cannot receive or give 
inheritance to a non-Muslim, and vice versa. 
Third, a Muslim man may marry up to four women at the same time, 
whereas a woman can only marry one man. 
Fourth, a Muslim man can divorce his wife or his wives simply by 
leaving them alone without any contract, talaq, with no obligation on 
the part of man to give reasons or justification for his action. On the 
contrary, a woman can only divorce with the permission from her 
husband or the decree of a state court which allows her to do so for 
particular reasons, such as inability or ignorance of husband in treating 
his wife. 
Fifth, concerning inheritance, a Muslim woman receives a lesser part 
than that of a Muslim man, even if they both have a family relationship 
with the dead. 
The influence of theological considerations, either exclusive or 
 
 76.  MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 215 (2008). 
 77.  YOHANAN FRIEDMANN, TOLERANCE AND COERCION IN ISLAM: INTERFAITH RELATIONS 
IN THE MUSLIM TRADITION 1–12 (2003). 
 78.  Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Sharia and Basic Human Rights Concerns, in LIBERAL 
ISLAM: A SOURCEBOOK 228–38 (Charles Kurzman ed., 1998). 
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inclusive, cannot be neglected in the discourse and praxis of freedom of 
religion or belief. Following the theoretical explanation in sociology that 
human action is influenced, among other things, by the system of 
meaning one has, the problem of freedom of religion  
 
or belief in Indonesia can also be traced back to the system of meaning 
used by society. 
III. DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR 
BELIEF IN INDONESIA 
In the context of evolving human rights in Indonesia, Muslim 
engagement began while Indonesia was preparing for independence. As 
has been much discussed in historical literature, prior to Indonesia’s 
independence, the Japanese occupation established an institution called 
Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), 
the Board for Investigating the Effort of Indonesia’s Independence 
Preparation. Aptly named, this board prepared for Indonesia’s 
independence. The establishment of BPUPKI began debates on human 
rights, which would become crucial parts of the Indonesian constitution. 
Historical literature has recorded human rights debates between two 
poles, Supomo on the one side, and Hatta and Yamin on the other, 
concerning the significance of human rights in the constitution. Supomo 
argued that the constitution, which would be used after the independence 
of Indonesia, should be free from chapters and articles concerning human 
rights.79 In Supomo’s view, human rights focus much more on 
individualism. He argues that the Indonesian state should be founded on 
the principles of familial values (kekeluargaan) and integralism.80 He 
believes that because individualism is embodied in human rights, it has 
no place in Indonesia, as it can separate individuals from the state.81 The 
Indonesian state, Supomo asserts, should maintain a totalistic unity 
between the population (individuals) and the state.82 With his view on 
integralism, Supomo seemed to have underestimated the possibility of 
the state committing violent acts on the citizens.83 On the other hand, 
 
 79.  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Pengantar, in HAK ASASI MANUSIA DALAM KONSTITUSI INDONESIA: 
DARI UUD 1945 SAMPAI DENGAN AMANDEMEN UUD 1945 TAHUN 2002 v–ix (2005); see also 
MARSILLAM SIMANJUNTAK, PANDANGAN NEGARA INTEGRALISTIK 13–14; 109–11 (1997). 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id.  
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Hatta, supported by Yamin, had anticipated the rise of this negative 
possibility, which was consciously underestimated by Supomo.84 
According to Hatta and Yamin, state authority can avoid negative 
practices when the constitution includes chapters and articles that 
recognize the basic human rights of Indonesian people.85 
The persistence of Hatta and Yamin resulted in compromise. One 
day after the declaration of independence (August 17, 1945), Indonesia 
passed the Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar), which was formulated 
by BPUPKI in July 1945. In the Constitution of 1945, which consists of 
thirty-seven articles, there are five articles which contain regulations on 
human rights: articles 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31.86 The article that contains 
the recognition of freedom of religion or belief is article 29, which reads 
as follows: (1) The state is based on the Oneness of God; (2) The state 
guarantees the freedom of each citizen to adhere to his own religion and 
to worship in accordance with his religion or belief.87 The incorporation 
of human rights into the Constitution of 1945 represented significant 
progress over Supomo’s ideas. Three years later, on December 10, 1948, 
the United Nations declared the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).88 
In some literature, religious preference, which was the basis of 
human rights discourse prior to independence, had never been discussed. 
Therefore, it is hard to assert that either Supomo or Hatta and Yamin 
were representatives of certain religious groups in Indonesia, such as 
Islam. A piece of literature that can be used as a reference to disclose the 
participation of Islam in national politics, at least during the Konstituante 
assembly (1956–1959), is Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang 
Percaturan dalam Konstituante.89 In this work, Maarif does not elaborate 
on the religious preferences referred to by Supomo, Hatta, and Yamin in 
their debates in the BPUPKI assembly. However, Maarif does mention 
religious preferences in human rights debates during the Konstituante 
assembly.90 During the assembly, discourse regarding human rights had 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] 1945, arts. 27, 28, 29, 
30, 31. 
 87.  Id. art. 29 
 88.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 89.  See AHMAD SYAFII MAARIF, ISLAM DAN MASALAH KENEGARAAN: STUDI TENTANG 
PERCATURAN DALAM KONSTITUANTE (1987). 
 90.  Id. 
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been relatively less vigorous than debates on state ideology and 
governmental system.91 The intensity of the debates on the two issues 
was shown by the polarization of ideologies among the members of the 
Konstituante into three groups: nationalist, Islamist, and socialist, which 
then finally crystallized into two mutually contradicting poles: Islamist 
and secularist.92 Although it was less intense than debates on state 
ideology and governmental system, human rights discourse in the 
Konstituante ought to be studied, for, as asserted by Todung Mulya 
Lubis, Islamic thoughts have contributed greatly to the evolving human 
rights ideas in Indonesia.93 
How did Muslim groups respond to human rights issues in the 
Konstituante? The research conducted by Maarif94 reveals a 
comparatively prominent figure who responded to the issue of human 
rights from an Islamic perspective, namely Hasbi Asshiddiqie, a 
Masyumi politician. Asshiddiqie, also well known as a reputable Muslim 
jurist, believed that the basis of human rights on Islamic grounds was 
quite necessary, as the Qur’an and the Sunnah provided a more complete 
discourse on human rights when compared to other religions or 
ideologies outside of Islam.95 Asshiddiqie asserted that using the Qur’an 
to influence thinking on human rights could help avoid the diversity and 
conflict that had occurred as a response to human rights in the West, 
because human rights in the West were based solely on philosophical 
thoughts resulting from human thinking.96 Asshiddiqie became more 
optimistic to the possibility of basing human rights on the Qur’an as he 
found many verses asserting the dignity of humankind.97 One of the 
Qur’anic verses quoted by Asshiddiqie is al-Isra’ (17) 70, which reads: 
“We have bestowed blessings on Adam’s children and guided them by 
land and sea. We have provided them with good things and exalted them 
above many of Our creatures.”98 According to Asshiddiqie, this verse 
proves that Islam appreciates universal humanity regardless of ethnicity, 
 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  See Ahmad Nur Fuad et al., Islam and Human Rights in Indonesia: An Account of 
Muslim Intellectuals’ Views, 45 AL-JAMI’AH J. OF ISLAMIC STUD., 241 (2007). 
 93.  TODUNG MULYA LUBIS, PERKEMBANGAN PEMIKIRAN, TEORI DAN PERDEBATAN HAM 
12 (2000). 
 94.  See MAARIF, supra note 89, at 172–73. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
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political preference, religious background, or other differences.99 
Moreover, on the basis of the above verse, Asshiddiqie elaborates three 
types of honor that God has bestowed upon humankind: (1) personal 
(individual) honor (karamah fardiyyah), consisting of material and 
spiritual dimensions; (2) collective honor (karamah ijtima’iyyah), which 
is that humankind, whatever his background, has an equal rank; and (3) 
political honor (karamah siyasiyyah), which means that Islam gives each 
individual political rights to elect and to be elected to political 
positions.100 
According to Asshiddiqie, the three concepts of honor elaborated 
from al-Isra’ (17) 70 can be used as the foundation to develop the 
relationship between Islam and important aspects of human rights: the 
right to life, self-salvation, self-protection, dignity, and property.101 As 
when dealing with human dignity, Asshiddiqie also searches for 
justification for these aspects of human rights in the Qur’an. The 
Qur’anic proof which Asshiddiqie refers to when mentioning the first 
right above is al-Ma’idah (5) 32, which reads: “whoever killed a human 
being, except as a punishment for murder or other wicked crimes, should 
be looked upon as though he had killed all mankind.”102 
Second is the right to freedom of religion and to adhere to a belief. 
This right is also based on the Qur’an, Yunus (10) 99 which reads: “Had 
your Lord pleased, all the people of the earth would have believed Him 
Would you then force faith upon men?”103 This verse, according to 
Asshiddiqie, contains an Islamic assertion of the principle of voluntarism 
in religion.104 Therefore, according to this principle, Asshiddiqie asserts 
that each individual is obliged to respect other people who adhere to the 
religion or belief he or she wishes.105 Other people cannot be compelled 
to adhere to Islam. To strengthen his statement, Asshiddiqie quotes the 
Qur’an, al-Baqarah  
 
 
(2) 256, which reads: “There shall be no compulsion in religion. True 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
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guidance is now distinct from error.”106 
Third is the right to own property. Asshiddiqie bases this right on the 
Qur’an, al-Nisa’ (4) 32: “Do not covet the favors by which Allah has 
exalted some of you above others. Men as well as women shall be 
rewarded for their labors. Rather implore Allah to bestow on you His 
gifts. Allah has knowledge of all things.”107 Although Islam gives 
recognition to property, Asshiddiqie reminds us of the social values 
embodied in the property of individuals. Those who have more property 
are obliged to distribute proportionally to other people who need.108 
Fourth is the right to choose and obtain occupation. This right is 
based on al-Mulk (67) 15: “It is He who has subdued the earth to you. 
Walk about its regions and eat of that which He has given you. To Him 
all shall return at the Resurrection.” 
Fifth is the right to freedom of opinion, expressing ideas, and the 
right to learning and education.109 According to Asshiddiqie, these rights 
indicate that Islam respects the use of reason, which allows people to 
avoid blind imitation (taqlid).110 Asshiddiqie mentions two proofs from 
the Qur’an that illustrate this right. The first proof is from al-A’raf (7) 
179: “We have predestined for Hell many jinn and many men. They have 
hearts, yet they cannot understand; eyes, yet they do not see; and ears, 
yet they do not hear. They are like beasts indeed, they are less 
enlightened. Such are the heedless;”111 The second proof is from al-
Tawbah (9) 122: “It is not right that all the faithful should go to war at 
once. A band from each community should stay behind to instruct 
themselves in religion and admonish their men when they return, so that 
they may take heed.”112 
Observing Asshiddiqie’s view above, Lubis’ assessment that Islam 
contributes to the development of human rights thinking in Indonesia is 
not an exaggeration. Asshiddiqie’s view—as constructed by Maarif—
does not reject the universal principles of human rights, including the 
freedom of religion or belief. He elegantly reveals an Islamic vision that 
affirms these crucial and sensitive freedoms. In fact, there are Islamic 
teachings that can be used to reconcile Islam and human rights, including 
 
 106.  Id. at 174. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 175. 
 110.  Id. at 176. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
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the freedom of religion or belief. 
In addition to Asshiddiqie, there are many other Muslim figures that 
have a constructive interpretation of human rights. After Indonesia 
passed the Konstituante Assembly, human rights continued to be a 
subject of debate among Muslims. The discourse on the relationship 
between Islam and human rights blossomed in Indonesia almost a decade 
after the Konstituante Assembly, a period which Greg Barton calls neo-
modernism.113 The neo-moderism period is an important phase in the 
history of Indonesian Islamic intellectualism. Fachry Ali and Bahtiar 
Effendy have fully recorded the process of proliferation of Islamic 
thought during this period.114 One of the important issues—besides 
democracy—which receives responses from Muslim intellectuals in this 
period, according to the research of Masykuri Abdillah,115 is the issue of 
human rights. Abdillah points out that Muslims have been much more 
intellectually open in response to human rights than to democracy.116 
Abdillah assesses that this difference is normal when considering the 
affinity between democracy and human rights in Islam.117 Compared to 
democracy, Abdillah asserts that human rights are much easier to 
recognize because of language similarities.118 In Arabic, the term haqq 
has been known earlier and translated into “right,” while democracy is 
not only seen as new vocabulary, but it is also seen as coming from the 
West. 
In Islamic intellectual tradition, the term haqq has been discussed 
before the term democracy. For example, the rights of Allah (huquq 
 
 113.  The term “neo-modernism” originates from Fazlur Rahman’s writings. Rahman uses this 
term to describe the four phases of the Islamic reform movement from the end of eighteenth century 
to the twentieth century. The first phase is the revivalist movement. This movement emerged in the 
end of eighteenth century and early nineteenth century (i.e., the Wahhabi movement in Arabia, the 
Sanusi movement in North Africa, and the Fulaniyah movement in West Africa). The second phase 
is the modernist movement. In India, this movement was pioneered by Sayyid Ahmad Khan. In 
Egypt, the modernist movement was pioneered by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, 
and Rashid Rida. The third phase was the neo-revivalist movement. This movement was exemplified 
by al-Mawdudi in Pakistan The fourth phase is neo-modernism. See GREG BARTON, THE 
EMERGENCE OF NEO-MODERNISM: A PROGRESSIVE, LIBERAL MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN 
INDONESIA: A TEXTUAL STUDY EXAMINING THE WRITING OF NURCHOLISH MADJID, DJOHAN 
EFFENDI, AHMAD WAHIB AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (1968–1980) (1995). 
 114.  See FACHRY ALI & BAHTIAR EFFENDY, MERAMBAH JALAN BARU ISLAM: 
REKONSTRUKSI PEMIKIRAN ISLAM INDONESIA MASA ORDE BARU (1986). 
 115.  See MASYKURI ABDILLAH, RESPONSES OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS TO THE 
CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY (1997). 
 116.  Id. at 97. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
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Allah), the human rights or the rights of individuals (huquq al-’ibad or 
huquq al-nas), and the common rights of Allah and humans are discussed 
in classical Islamic sciences.119 The rights of Allah are all the rights and 
obligations that are ordained through revelation and religious teachings. 
The rights of Allah can be an obligation in the form of commandments 
and rituals. Additionally, the rights of Allah can also be in the form of a 
number of activities that benefit a larger segment of society, including 
protecting society from destruction and recommending virtuous acts. 
Various obligations embodied in the pillars of Islam, such as a profession 
of faith, praying, giving alms, fasting during Ramadan, and performing 
pilgrimage, are ways to fulfill the rights of Allah. 
Individual rights, whether secular or civilian, constitute a realm that 
embodies general and specific rights. The right to health, the right to 
have children, and the right to safety are examples of general individual 
rights. Individual rights can also be specific, such as the protection of 
property ownership or the right to conduct a commercial transaction. 
Common rights originate from religious teachings or human reason. 
An example of common rights is divorced women’s obligation to have a 
‘iddah (waiting period) of three menstruation periods in order to 
determine whether the women are pregnant. The logic is that God (Allah) 
decides genealogy based on the father and that genealogy can only be 
received through a valid marriage. Thus, the waiting period should be 
observed for divorced women or widows before they will be allowed to 
marry again. 
The term haqq, in Islamic intellectual tradition, has evolved into the 
concept of huquq al-ibad or huquq al-nas (human rights or the rights of 
individuals) besides huquq Allah (rights of Allah). The concept of 
common rights indicates that human rights have received sufficient 
attention from Islam. This reality directly challenges the over-
generalized opinion that Islam cannot be used as the cultural foundation 
for universal human rights principles. One expert that argues the over-
generalization is Samuel Huntington.120 He is well known as an adherent 
to the theory of cultural relativism, which rejects the view of universal 
human rights. According to Huntington, who proposed “the clash of 
civilizations”121thesis, human rights are the product of the West.122 For 
 
 119.  See OZLEM DENLI HARVEY, ISLAM AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM CONTEMPORARY TURKEY 43–44 (2000). 
 120.  Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993). 
 121.  The Clash of Civilizations is a theory, proposed by political scientist Samuel P. 
Huntington, which posits that cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict 
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Huntington, the West’s efforts to promote universal human rights are 
counterproductive.123 Huntington believes that the West’s dissemination 
of human rights to the Muslim world is a factor that fosters the 
emergence of Islamic fundamentalism.124 
In contemporary human rights discourse, Huntington follows the 
adversarial perspective that tends to create a contradiction between Islam 
and human rights. The adversarial perspective, according to Mashood A. 
Baderin, cannot help disseminate human rights in a culturally diverse 
society.125 In the context of Muslim society, Baderin believes that Islam 
promotes human rights. This view is known as the harmonic 
perspective.126 Baderin argues that the harmonic perspective has a great 
opportunity to be developed, because Islam has the necessary theological 
and scientific foundations, as indicated by the Qur’anic verses and the 
fundamental concept of human rights mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs.127 
It is necessary to add how the fundamental concept of huquq al-nas 
(rights of individuals) has taken root in the field of fiqh (Islamic law) to 
strengthen the harmony between Islam and human rights. Fiqh (Islamic 
law) is discussed in this part of the article because of its popularity in the 
field of Islamic education, including education in Indonesia. In the study 
of Islamic law, there are many discussions called maqasid al-shari’ah 
(the objectives of shari’ah). Satria Effendi128 perceives maqasid al-
shari’ah as the objectives of Allah and His messenger in formulating 
Islamic laws. These objectives can be traced to the Qur’an and the 
Prophetic tradition as a logical reason for the formulation of law, which 
 
in the post-Cold War world. This theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture at the American 
Enterprise Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of 
Civilizations?", in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man. 
Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order. The book has been translated into Indonesian: SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, BENTURAN 
ANTARPERADABAN DAN MASA DEPAN POLITIK DUNIA (M. Sadat Ismail trans., 2000). 
 122.  Huntington, supra note 120, at 40. 
 123.  Id. at 31. 
 124.  Id. at 41. Other scholars adamantly disagree with Huntington. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 
Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 307, 311 (1994). 
 125.  Mashood A. Baderin, Islam and the Realization of Human Rights in the Muslim World: 
A Reflection on Two Essential Approaches and Two Divergent Perspectives, 4 MUSLIM WORLD J. 
HUM. RTS., 1, 10–13 (2007). 
 126.  Id. at 13–24. 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  SATRIA EFFENDI & M. ZEIN, USHUL FIQH 233–37 (2005). 
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is designed to benefit humankind. Among the experts of Islamic law, 
there has been a consensus of opinion regarding the objectives of 
shari’ah (Islamic law), which are to maintain human benefit and avoid 
destruction (mafsadat), either in this world or in hereafter.129 To achieve 
this benefit and avoid destruction, there are five points which should be 
given attention: religion, soul, reason, offspring, and property. These five 
points are also called the core of Islamic law. In other words, the 
objective of Islamic law is to provide protection for religion, soul, 
reason, offspring, and property. A Muslim who is called mukallaf (a 
person obliged to perform the regulations of Allah) can receive the 
benefit and can avoid destruction if he or she is able to achieve these five 
points. 
Muslim intellectuals always refer to these five points, or the 
objectives of Islamic law, when developing the concept of human rights 
from an Islamic perspective. One of the five points of Islamic law is the 
protection of religion, which is closely related to the issue of freedom of 
religion or belief. It is interesting that when the concept of protection of 
religion (hifz al-din) is connected to the issue of freedom of religion or 
belief, Muslim intellectuals have inclusive points of view. Masdar F. 
Mas’udi’s views are illuminating in this regard.130 In one of his articles, 
Mas’udi argues that the principle of freedom of belief is part of the 
protection of religion.131 Therefore, Mas’udi asserts that compulsion in 
religion is prohibited by Islamic law.132 Consequently, Mas’udi 
disagrees with Islamic law regulations that punish those who convert to 
other religions. Mas’udi reasons as follows: 
Initially, riddah (apostasy) is the right of each individual since it is said 
in the Qur’an “those who wish to believe, believe, and those who wish 
to disbelieve, disbelieve.” The choice of belief or disbelief is an 
individual choice. It is the case with salat (prayer); indeed there is no 
punishment for those who do not perform salat. But later on, Muslim 
rulers (in Islamic history, the writer) claimed themselves as the 
manifestation of God. Therefore, the rights of Allah then were taken 
over by rulers (state) and the state then tried to enforce the rights of 
Allah towards human beings. Accordingly, salat, which is initially the 
affair of individuals with Allah, then became the affair of individual 
 
 129.  Id. at 238. 
 130.  MASDAR MAS’UDI, Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Islam, in DISEMINASI HAK ASASI 
MANUSIA: PERSPEKTIF DAN AKSI 63 (E. Shobirin Nadj & Naning Mardinah eds., 2000). 
 131.  Id. at 64. 
 132.  Id. at 65. 
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with sultans (rulers), where they had the right to punish those who do 
not pray. It is also the case with those who convert (apostates). This is 
actually the right of the individual, related to the right of Allah, to 
believe or not to believe in God. But then these rights of Allah were 
taken over by the rulers; therefore, the rulers functioned as God, 
compelling individuals and giving punishment for the apostates who 
change their religion.133 
Jalaluddin Rakhmat134 is another Muslim intellectual who has an 
inclusive opinion in understanding the concept of the protection of 
religion. Like Mas’udi, Rakhmat also includes “the doctrine of no 
compulsion in religion” as an important point of the concept of the 
protection of religion.135 Rakhmat asserts that freedom of religion must 
be protected from any aggressive action to limit this freedom.136 
Rakhmat mentions four specific religious freedoms mandated by Islam 
that should be protected from aggressive actions: (1) freedom to choose 
religion; (2) freedom to adhere to religion; (3) freedom to conceal 
religion; and (4) freedom to express religion.137 
Dawam Rahardjo’s points of view should also be mentioned in this 
part of the Article. One of Rahardjo’s intellectual concerns is religious 
pluralism or diversity.138 Rahardjo firmly asserts that religion is an 
individual affair which no state or religious authority can interfere 
with.139 To support his argument, Rahardjo refers to the principle of la 
rahbaniyah fi al-Islam (no priesthood in Islam).140 For Rahardjo, 
religious authority tends to reduce religious freedom.141 Yet, faith cannot 
be compelled by any authority, as emphasized by the principle of la 
ikraha fi al-din (no compulsion in religion). To guarantee the 
implementation of freedom of religion or belief, according to Rahardjo, 
the existence of regulation or law is absolutely needed.142 The law, 
 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Jalaluddin Rahmat, Hak-hak Rakyat: Perspektif Islam, in AGAMA DAN HAK RAKYAT 
106–114 (Masadar F. Mas’udi ed., 2003). 
 135.  Id. at 109. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 110. 
 138.  M. Dawam Rahardjo, Dasasila Kebebasan Beragama [Ten Principles of Religious 
Freedom], ISLAMLIB.COM (NOV. 25, 2005), http://islamlib.com/id/artikel/dasasila-kebebasan-
beragama. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
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which Rahardjo calls the Law of Freedom of Religion, should guarantee 
religious freedoms including the following: 
First is an individual’s freedom to choose a religion and the freedom 
to worship in accordance with his own religion or belief.143 
Second is freedom to not have a religion.144 Although the Indonesian 
constitution states that the state is based on the “Oneness of God,”145 
freedom of religion also means freedom to not believe in God or to have 
an atheistic belief. However, not all atheisms can be given a guarantee. 
Rahardjo restricts atheism that must be given a guarantee to atheism in 
the form of scientific discourse.146 Concerning atheism in the form of 
anti-religion and anti-God, Rahardjo recommends it be banned by the 
state because it contradicts the Pancasila, particularly the first pillar, 
which is the Oneness of God.147 
Third is freedom to convert to another religion.148 According to 
Rahardjo, changing religions cannot be regarded as apostasy but rather 
an effort to find a new consciousness in religiosity.149 Rahardjo also 
rejects the view that a person who converts to another religion is called 
kafir (infidel) because the term kafir only describes a person opposing 
the command of God.150 
Fourth is the freedom to preach.151 According to Rahardjo, the 
 
 143.  See id. 
 144.  See id. 
 145.  See id. 
 146.  See id. 
 147.  See id. 
 148.  See id. 
 149.  See id. 
 150. Although many people in Indonesia convert to other religions, for example from Islam to 
non-Islam, the converts are not punished in accordance with positive law in Indonesia. This is 
somewhat different from other countries with Muslims as the majority. One prominent example 
which received special attention internationally is the case of Lina Joy. Initially this Malaysian 
citizen was named Azlina Jailani. But, after conversion from Islam to Christianity at age 26, this 
woman of ethnic Malay heritage changed her name to Lina Joy. Joy’s conversion did not receive 
certification from the Malaysian Federal Court, although Joy herself wished to be certified so that 
her new identity (Christian) would be apparent from her MyKad (citizen identity card) of Malaysia. 
According to the Federal High Court, only the Islamic Shari’ah Court had the authority to permit the 
change in religious identity in Joy’s identity card. Meanwhile, Joy rejected the argument of the 
Federal High Court because she is an adherent of Christianity and argued the she need not follow the 
regulation of Islamic Shari’ah Court. This rejection by the Federal High Court impacted the planning 
of Joy’s marriage to her Christian fiancé. The marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim is not 
allowed by the legal regulation of Malaysia and shari’ah law. See Kisah Lina Joy [Lina Joy Story], 
TRULY ISLAM BLOG, http://trulyislam.blogspot.com/2009/01/kisah-para-mantan-muslim-
murtadin.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).  
 151.  Rahardjo, supra note 138. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2013 2:40 PM 
775 Indonesian Discourse on Human Rights and Religious Freedom 
 801 
activities of preaching (da’wah) that should be protected are those which 
are not conducted through violence or compulsion, either directly or 
indirectly.152 Besides preaching without violence and compulsion, 
preaching activities cannot be unethical, as asserted by Rahardjo below: 
Activities of preaching (da’wah) to gain followers, through distributing 
food and scholarship for the children of the poor or giving free health 
services with the requirement to adhere to a certain religion, are not 
ethical efforts because “buying” the belief of individuals humiliates 
human dignity. But, assistance programs like this are allowed to be 
conducted by a religious organizations as far as they do not compel 
people to adhere to a certain religion. 
The spreading of religion through offering faith and salvation directly 
from person to person or through visits to people’s houses with the 
intention for proliferation is an impolite and a disturbing action; 
therefore it should be prohibited. The activities of spreading religion 
through giving information are not prohibited, but the efforts of 
Christianization or Islamization for proliferation is not allowed. If the 
mechanism of religious preaching can be regulated, there is no longer 
an accusation of Christianization, Islamization, or apostatizing. 153 
 
 
Fifth, freedom of religion also means that the state must be just 
toward all religions.154 In order for a state to be fair and just, it needs to 
revise policies which potentially lead to injustice among certain religious 
group. For example, Rahardjo is critical of the Indonesian citizen identity 
card (KTP) that requires citizens to disclose their religious identities.155 
Rahardjo sees this policy as an opportunity for state favouritism and 
discrimination.156 
Sixth, the state should allow a marriage between two persons of 
different religions if the marriage is an individual or family decision.157 
 
 152.  See id. 
 153.  See id. 
 154.  See id. 
 155.  See also Act Concerning Population Administration (Law No. 23/2006), art. 64 (1) 
(Indon.). In article 64 (1) there is a provision that the ID card must include the symbol of Garuda 
Pancasila, the map of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, and load a description of NIK (main 
number of population), name, place and date of birth, sex, religion, marital status, blood type, 
address, occupation, nationality, validity, place and date of ID card issuance, ID card holder’s 
signature, and the names and employee identification numbers of the officials that sign it. 
 156.  See id. 
 157.  See id. 
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Although a religious authority can issue fatwa (religious advices), which 
discourage inter-religious marriage because they are seen as unlawful, 
the fatwa issued by religious authority cannot not bind the state. 
Individual and family views should not be binding on the state. 
Seventh, in education, each student is given the right to decide what 
religion to study.158 Although the parents can influence and even decide 
what their children will study, their choice cannot automatically prevail. 
These rights also include a student’s choice not to take a course on a 
certain religion. Regardless of a student’s choice to either study or not 
study a particular religion, the student must still take an ethics course, 
because the course helps students become good citizens. 
Eighth, each citizen has the right to create a religious group, or even 
build a new religion, provided that he does not disturb the public order 
and does not perform practices that are illegal or unethical or use the 
religion to deceive someone else.159 This freedom is applied to those 
who will establish associations for health, emotional, and spiritual well-
being based on the teachings of many  
 
religions, as long as adherence to a particular faith is not a requirement. 
Ninth, the state or a religious authority is not allowed to make legal 
decisions that affirm that a certain religious group is heretical and 
misleading, except if the group conducts illegal or unethical practices.160 
A religious authority can give guidance concerning rituals, faith, and law 
(shari’ah), but it cannot bind the state or its citizens. 
Nurcholish Madjid is another Muslim intellectual who must certainly 
be mentioned when discussing the development of Islamic neo-
modernism in Indonesia. Madjid’s thoughts have a much wider spectrum 
than those of Mas’udi, Rakhmat, Rahardjo, and Mulia. Madjid addresses 
almost all subjects of Islamic thought in his analysis. Like other Muslim 
intellectuals, Madjid also refers to the Qur’an when dealing with the 
issue of freedom of religion or belief. Like other Muslim intellectuals, 
Madjid argues that Islam can be used as the theological foundation of 
freedom of religion or belief.161 
Madjid’s perspective of looking at freedom of religion or belief is 
 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  See NURCHOLISH MADJID, ISLAM DOKTRIN DAN PERADABAN: TELAAH KRITIS TENTANG 
MASALAH KEIMANAN, KEMANUSIAAN, DAN KEMODERNAN lxviii (1992). 
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based on an understanding of the spirit of Islamic teachings.162 
According to Madjid, in the spirit of Islamic teaching, after the deity 
(habl min Allah), is humanity (habl min al-nas).163 In regards to 
humanity, Islam teaches that human life is essentially characterized by 
diversity.164 This diversity, Madjid asserts, cannot be rejected or avoided 
by human beings because it is one of God’s grand designs.165 Madjid’s 
affirmative view on diversity is based on the Qur’an, Hud (11) 118–119: 
“Had your Lord please, He would have united all mankind. But only 
those whom He has shown mercy will cease to differ. For this end He 
has created them. The word of your Lord shall be fulfilled: ‘I will fill the 
pit of Hell with jinn and men.’”166 According to Madjid, Allah’s 
commandment in this verse affirms that Islam teaches diversity. “Thus, 
there is no monolithic society, which is same and equal in all aspects,” 
says Madjid.167 He asserts that human beings must manage this diversity 
on the principles of pluralism.168 Islam, besides affirming the plurality of 
human life, provides freedom for different groups to exist and take on 
life in conformity with their own beliefs.169 Islamic vision in this regard, 
for Madjid, is parallel to pluralism.170 He asserts: 
If in the Sacred Book (the Qur’an) it is mentioned that a human being is 
created to nations and races in order for them to mutually recognize and 
respect one another (al-Hujurat [49]: 13), plurality develops into 
pluralism, i.e. a value system which perceives diversity positively and 
optimistically, accepts it as reality, and performs the best on the basis 
of this reality. In the Sacred Book it is also mentioned that differences 
of human being in language and color should be accepted as positive 
reality, as one of the signs of God’s greatness. (Q. al-Rum [30]: 32). 
There is also affirmation in the Sacred Book regarding diversity in 
opinions and ways of life among human beings, which need not to be 
feared, but ought to be used as a basis for racing into goodness, and that 
it is God who will explain why human being is diverse, later when 
 
 162.  See id. at x. 
 163.  See id. 
 164.  See id. at lxix. 
 165.  See id. at lxx. 
 166.  See id. at lxxi. 
 167.  NURCHOLISH MADJID, ISLAM AGAMA KEMANUSIAAN: MEMBANGUN TRADISI DAN VISI 
BARU ISLAM INDONESIA 196 (1995). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 199. 
 170.  Id. 
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returning to Him (Q. al-Ma’idah [5]: 48).171 
In Madjid’s view, this inclusive view of Islam characterized by 
diversity, which is parallel to pluralism, can be used as a basis for 
guaranteeing freedom of religion or belief. Madjid seemingly has no 
issue connecting freedom of religion or belief to Islam, although this 
issue is complicated and touches on emotional aspects. For Madjid, 
discussing freedom of religion or belief from an Islamic perspective is 
normal because the Qur’an elegantly guarantees it. Since the Qur’an 
provides this guarantee, Madjid asserts that Muslims must be mature 
when dealing with the issue of freedom of religion or belief.172 He states: 
The principle of freedom of religion is concerned with complicated 
matters, as it relates to emotional aspects and deep feelings of our life. 
The implementation of the principle of freedom of religion will work 
very well if each of us is able to prevent emotional victory over healthy 
reasoning. This ability is concerned with the level of a certain maturity 
and our own consistency, either in individual or collective levels. In the 
Qur’an, the principle of religious freedom is clearly related to an 
attitude with no emotion, with healthy reasons and our stability in our 
selves, because we believe in the existence of clear criteria of the right 
and the false: “There shall be no compulsion in religion. True guidance 
is now distinct from error. He that renounces idol-worship and puts his 
faith in Allah shall grasp a firm handle that will never break. Allah 
hears all and knows all.” (Q. al-Baqarah [2]: 256).173 
Because Madjid understands the Qur’an to be so inclusive regarding 
some issues relating to human rights at the empirical level, openness is 
also needed towards human rights which have become universal ideas of 
mankind.174 In some of his books, Madjid seems to have not 
contradicted human rights on the basis of a particular cultural preference, 
such as Islam and Indonesian society, as normally occurs among cultural 
relativists.175 In his book, Islam Agama Kemanusiaan, Madjid makes an 
interesting affirmation that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
formulated by the United Nations constitutes a standard reference when 
dealing with human rights.176 
For Madjid, the relation between Islam and human rights and one of 
 
 171.  MADJID, supra note 161, at lxviii. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  NURCHOLISH MADJID, CITA-CITA POLITIK ISLAM ERA REFORMASI 73 (1999). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  MADJID, supra note 167, at 207. 
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its derivatives, the freedom of religion or belief, is not contradictory. 
However, opposite points of view should also be considered. In 
Indonesia, hardliner Muslim groups openly reject human rights.177 One 
of these groups is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI categorically 
rejects human rights which emerge from democracy.178 HTI is a well-
known religious group that opposes democracy.179 Consequently, HTI 
rejects all thought which is derived from democracy, such as freedom.180 
In this book, Zallum, an HTI activist, categorically rejects democracy as 
it originates from Western culture.181 For Zallum, democracy sold by the 
West is an infidel system; democracy has no relation to Islam, either 
directly or indirectly.182 He holds the following view on democracy:183 
First, democracy is part of the product of human reason, not from 
Allah. Democracy is not based on revelation and does not have a 
relation to any religion which has ever been revealed by Allah to His 
messenger. 
Second, democracy emerges from the belief in the separation of 
religion from life, which subsequently results in the separation of 
religion from state. 
Third, democracy is founded on two ideas: (1) sovereignty in the hand 
of people; and (2) people are the source of authority (power). 
Fourth, democracy is the system of government by the majority. The 
election of rulers and members of legislature is conducted on the basis 
of the majority of electorates. All decisions in these institutions are also 
taken on the basis of majority opinions. 
Fifth, democracy states the prevalence of four types of general 
freedom: (1) freedom of religion; (2) freedom of speech; (3) freedom of 
ownership; (4) personal freedom. 
With the above understanding, Zallum labels democracy as infidel. 
As an infidel system, Zallum asserts its legal implication is clear. He 
 
 177.  ABDUL QADIM ZALLUM, PEMIKIRAN POLITIK ISLAM 200 (2001). 
 178.  Id. at 201. 
 179.  Id. at 202–03. 
 180. See ABDUL AL-QADIM ZALLUM, DEMOKRASI SISTEM KUFUR: HARAM MENGAMBIL, 
MENERAPKAN, DAN MENYEBARLUASKANNYA [DEMOCRACY INFIDEL SYSTEM: ADOPTING, 
IMPLEMENTING, AND SPREADING IT UNLAWFULLY] 11 (2003). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. See also SYAMSUL ARIFIN, IDEOLOGI DAN PRAKSIS GERAKAN SOSIAL KAUM 
FUNDAMENTALIS: PENGALAMAN HIZB AL-TAHRIR INDONESIA 144–54 (2010). 
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maintains that Muslims are prohibited from adopting a democratic 
system because it is unlawful to adopt a capitalist economic system.184 
To support his argument, Zallum highlights some aspects of democracy 
which he sees as contradictory to Islam.185 First is the concept that 
sovereignty is in the hands of people. In Zallum’s view, this concept 
contradicts Islam, which perceives sovereignty as in the hand of God, the 
shari’ah (law) giver, not in the hand of human (ummah).186 Zallum then 
asserts the following:187 
Ummah in its entirety has no right to make law, even one law. If all 
Muslim ummah gather, then they agree on various aspects which 
contradict Islam—such as allowing riba (interest) in order to enhance 
economic conditions; allowing the localization of adultery in order to 
prevent its spread in society; abolishing individual ownership; 
abolishing fasting in Ramadan in order to increase productivity; or 
adopting the idea of individual freedom which gives freedom to an 
individual Muslim to adhere to whatever belief he wishes, giving the 
right to enhance his property with whatever means (although unlawful), 
giving freedom to enjoy life as he wants, as to drink wine (khamr) and 
conduct adultery—all these decisions mean nothing. Yet, in the view of 
Islam, these agreements have no value at all, although when compared 
to the value of a wing of a mosquito. If there is a group of Muslims 
which agrees with these matters, they should be offended until they 
release themselves from these agreements. 
Another element of democracy that Zallum says is contradictory to 
Islam is the concept of government by the majority.188 In Zallum’s 
thought, the majority should not decide the law; instead, the law should 
be based on the sacred text (shari’ah) because Allah is the only law 
maker.189 Therefore, who has the authority to adopt the law of shari’ah? 
Zallum says that the caliph, who concludes the law from shar’i texts of 
the Qur’an and the Traditions of the Prophet, has the authority.190 
Then, Zallum views the democratic principles of general freedom, 
which consists of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of 
ownership, and freedom of behaviour as contradictory to Islam. 
 
 184.  ZALLUM, supra note 180, at 12. 
 185.  Id. at 13. 
 186.  Id. at 63. 
 187.  Id. at 63–64. 
 188.  Id. at 73. 
 189.  Id. at 80. 
 190.  Id. 
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According to Zallum, these four freedoms are not found in Islam. A 
Muslim is obliged to legally bind himself to the shari’ah in all his deeds. 
A Muslim is not allowed to behave as he wishes. In Islam, there is no 
freedom, except freedom of slaves from slavery, and slavery itself has 
been abolished by Islam. 
After explaining HTI’s views, it can be concluded that Muslims have 
different opinions regarding human rights. These differences will 
become even more apparent in the following part. 
 
IV. ISLAM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
With exposure to HTI’s views, it is clear that Muslims differ in 
opinion in response to human rights issues. Basically, there are leaders 
who have an inclusive outlook on Islam while others have an exclusive 
one. The inclusive leaders accept the universal idea of human rights, 
including the freedom of religion or belief. For them, human rights ought 
not to be regarded as a concept contradictory to Islam. Although many 
Muslim countries have recognized and ratified human rights instruments 
issued by the United Nations, the inclusivist thinkers employ theology 
and history to support their position. Theologically, Islam has an 
authentic source which can be used as a legitimizing factor for Muslim 
acceptance of human rights. That source is the Qur’an. 
According to the inclusivists, there are many verses in the Qur’an 
that support the fundamental ideas of human rights emerging in the West. 
The Qur’anic verses often quoted by the inclusivists are: al-Baqarah (2) 
256—”There is no compulsion in religion. Verily, the Right Path has 
become distinct from the wrong path. Whoever disbelieves in Taaghoot 
(false gods, etc.) and believes in Allaah, then he has grasped the most 
trustworthy handhold that will never break. And Allaah is All-Hearer, 
All-Knower”; al-Kahfi (18): 29—”And say: “The truth is from your 
Lord.” Then whosoever wills, let him believe, and whosoever wills, let 
him disbelieve. Verily, We have prepared for the Zalimun (polytheists 
and wrong-doers, etc.), a Fire whose walls will be surrounding them 
(disbelievers in the Oneness of Allah). And if they ask for help (relief, 
water, etc.) they will be granted water like boiling oil, that will scald 
their faces. Terrible the drink, and an evil Murtafaqa (dwelling, resting 
place, etc.)!”; and al-Kafirun (109): 6—”To you be your religion, and to 
me my religion (Islamic Monotheism).” For the inclusivists, these verses 
are evidence of Islam’s recognition of freedom of religion or belief, 
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which is within the scope of human rights. Basing their views on the 
three verses above and others, the inclusivists argue that religion is 
essentially a private affair which cannot be interfered with by anybody, 
including the state. 
Inclusivists differ drastically from exclusivists or those who believe 
that Islam and human rights are mutually exclusive. According to 
exclusivists, human rights cannot be applied in a Muslim society. They 
argue that the concept of human rights issued by the United Nations 
cannot be applied universally because human rights are dominated by 
Western ideas. One human right often criticized by the exclusivists is 
freedom of religion or belief. In their view, freedom of religion or belief 
cannot be applied universally in Muslim society although the Qur’an 
often deals with the issue of freedom. Freedom in the Qur’an applies 
only externally, so only non-Muslims who want to convert to Islam are 
afforded freedom of religion, while those who have embraced Islam have 
no other choice except to remain Muslims. 
The inclusivist and exclusivist perspectives are apparently hard to 
reconcile. As can be expected, the development of religious freedom 
discourse will likely remain divided into two views. This prediction is 
based on the transitional democratization process that is underway in 
Indonesia. What is the relationship between the discourse of freedom of 
religion or belief and these two polarizing perspectives? The transitional 
phase of democratization is characterized by transparency. At this stage, 
the various elements of society gain the freedom to articulate their 
opinions even if they are different from the state and other groups. 
Religious discourse is also growing rapidly at this stage of the so-called 
“reform era.” 
Therefore, the emergence of inclusive and exclusive discourse 
should not be viewed as a strange phenomenon. The discourse has not 
caused a state of anarchy in Indonesia, contrary to wide-spread reports. 
Therefore, religious differences and ideas do not always lead to anarchy. 
The diversity discourse in Indonesia was unavoidable. However, the 
development of a more affirmative and positive discourse on human 
rights and freedom of religion or belief is possible. A more positive and 
beneficial discourse can be achieved by using Muslim education 
institutions owned by Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to 
promote human rights and freedom of religion or belief. 
 
